18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

492 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition the exception of graduating students, who were refunded the value of the unused portions at the end of the semester. Plaintiff also alleged that the rollover plan was insufficient and that Defendant did not refund any student fees. Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s proposed class was overbroad, as it would include persons who could not have been harmed by Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct. Defendant asserted that the class, as currently proposed, included employees, parents, friends, relatives, or anyone else who potentially paid for tuition on behalf of a student, and those third-parties, unlike students, have not entered into contracts with Defendant. The Court agreed that family friends, employers, or anyone else who paid tuition on behalf of students would not have standing to sue because only the students and the university were parties to the contract. Id . at *8. Plaintiff requested thereafter that the Court certify a class of students in the event that it rejected the inclusion of individuals who paid for housing costs and fees on behalf of students. However, the Court rejected that request on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to propose an alternative definition for its class. The Court declined to create a new definitions on its own without proposed alternative definitions from Plaintiff. For these reasons, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. Metzner, et al. v. Quinnipiac University, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56744 (D. Conn. March 25, 2021). Plaintiff, a group of students and their parents, brought a putative class action arising out of Defendant’s failure to issue tuition or fee refunds to students following its decision to transition to online learning during the Spring 2020 semester in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs complaint alleged claims of breach of contract in Count I, breach of implied contract in Count II, unjust enrichment in Count III, and conversion in Count IV. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion. The Court dismissed the Parent Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims for lack of standing on the grounds that it was the student and not the parent that suffered the alleged injury-in- fact that was traceable to the alleged actions of the school. The Parent Plaintiffs asserted that they had satisfied each of the three requirements of Article III standing, including: (i) injury-in-fact, (ii) causation, and (iii) redressability. The Parent-Plaintiffs argued that the loss of tuition payments that they remitted to Defendant for the in- person education of their children constituted an injury-in-fact, which was fairly traceable to Defendant’s decision not to issue tuition or fee reimbursements for the Spring 2020 semester. Defendant asserted that the Parent Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege any facts that would establish that they themselves were entitled to on-campus instruction or facilities or that they entered into a contract for educational services with Defendant directly. The Court agreed with Defendant. It found that to the extent that the Parent Plaintiffs believed that they had suffered a financial loss by paying for in-person instead of online classes, such a loss did not derive from any alleged contract with Defendant but, rather, from a private arrangement between the Parent Plaintiffs and their children. The Court therefore dismissed the Parent-Plaintiffs’ claims as to Counts I, II, and III for lack of standing. Defendant also argued that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. Under this doctrine, case law precedents almost universally have held that claims of educational malpractice are not cognizable. The Court noted that the doctrine applies where the essence of the complaint was that an educational institution breached its agreement by failing to provide an effective education. In response, Plaintiffs claimed that they were not contesting the manner with which Defendant and its faculty implemented online teaching instruction, and instead they challenged Defendant’s decision to retain tuition and fees for educational services that the institution allegedly promised but never provided. The Court agreed with Plaintiffs that the educational malpractice doctrine did not apply in this case and did not bar Plaintiffs claims at this stage. However, the Court agreed with Defendant that Plaintiffs’ claim of entitlement to a tuition refund sounded in breach of contract and thus could not be enforced via a conversion action. For these reasons, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ conversion claim. In sum, the Court dismissed the Parent Plaintiffs from the lawsuit, and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss to the conversion claim. In all other respects, the Court denied Defendant’s motion. Michel, et al. v. Yale University, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126050 (D. Conn. July 7, 2021). Plaintiff brought a putative class action on behalf of himself and other similarly-situated students alleging claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, as well as a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of Defendant’s decision not to partially refund his tuition and fees after the University transitioned from in-person to virtual instruction in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court granted Defendant’s motion. The Court noted that in that in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, colleges and universities across the country had closed their

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