18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

488 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition students, Plaintiffs Gociman and Hickey lacked standing because they did not sustain an injury-in-fact. The Court agreed that since Plaintiffs Gociman and Hickey did not allege that their children were minors, they could not sue on their child’s behalf. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss claims by Gociman and Hickey due to a lack of an injury-in-fact. As to failure to state a claim, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed because they amounted to allegations of educational malpractice that were not cognizable under Illinois law. Id . at *6. The Court explained that the theory underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims was that the education that Plaintiffs received once Defendant transitioned to remote instruction in response to the COVID-19 pandemic was "worth significantly less than the value of live classes." Id . at *7. Accordingly, the Court determined that "resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims would require the Court to make judgments about the quality and value of the education . . . provided in the Spring 2020 semester." Id . at *7-8. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims were the type of educational malpractice claims that had been rejected in COVID-related litigation throughout the country. Id . at *8. The Court further found that the breach of contract claim failed because Plaintiffs did not allege that Defendant made a specific promise for in-person instruction. Although the course catalogue discussed in person classes, there was no express language that Defendant could not move to online classes in the event of a global pandemic. Plaintiffs also argued that in-person instruction was implied by the difference in tuition for the "in-person" and "online-program." Id . at *11. The Court, however, opined that the difference in tuition was insufficient to allege a specific contractual promise. Id. at *12. The Court concluded that none of the materials identified by Plaintiffs demonstrated a promise to provide in-person instruction and in- person services, and therefore it granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim. As to Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim, the Court reasoned that it specifically incorporated allegations of the existence of a contract between the parties, and therefore it must be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Harris, et al. v. University Of Massachusetts , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162444 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of students, filed a class action alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with Defendants requiring that students be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 to return to campus. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from enforcing the vaccine requirements prior to the fall semester. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The Court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Plaintiffs’ motion. Defendants required students to upload their vaccination status cards into Defendant’s IT system prior to returning to campus, and in the event the choose not to do so, they could attend the university virtually. The Court explained that to succeed on a procedural due process claim, Plaintiffs "must identify a protected liberty or property interest and allege that the Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived [them] of that interest without constitutionally adequate process." Id . at *14. Plaintiffs asserted a liberty interest in continuing their education and contended that they were forced to "take an unapproved vaccine or leave." Id . at *15. The Court reasoned that those who decline to be vaccinated were prohibited from in-person classes, dormitories, and other activities this semester, but could remain enrolled and still take classes online. Therefore, Plaintiffs were not denied an education. The Court further reasoned that even assuming such deprivation, their procedural due process claim still failed because the vaccine policy was generally applicable to all students and formulated prospectively to the fall semester. As such, Plaintiffs were "not entitled to [process] above and beyond the notice provided by the enactment and publication" of the vaccine policy itself. Id . Accordingly, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim that they were denied procedural due process. The Court also found that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for a violation of substantive due process because they did not identify a fundamental right protected by the due process clause, as the vaccine policy was not related to a legitimate government end. Further, the Court explained that the U.S. Supreme Court has determined “that it is within the police power of a state to provide for compulsory vaccination," which the state may delegate to local officials and others vested with “broad discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of the law." Id . at *17. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process claim. The Court also found that irreparable harm, balance of harms, and the public interest did not weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ requested relief. The Court held that students who chose not to comply with may still take online classes, or defer their enrollment for a semester. Moreover, the balance of equities tipped in Defendants’ favor given the strong public interest in preventing further spread of COVID-19 on campus. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

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