EEOC-Initiated Litigation - 2022 Edition

© 2022 Seyfarth Shaw LLP EEOC-Initiated Litigation: 2022 Edition | 71 she informed Defendant of this belief; and (iii) she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. In so ruling, the Court rejected Defendant’s position that Hadith was not constructively discharged (because she voluntarily resigned from the training program). It held that the EEOC had presented triable issues with respect to Hadith's constructive discharge. In addition, the Court found that there was also a genuine issue of fact as to whether (i) Defendant's proposed accommodation was reasonable and (ii) Hadith's preferred accommodation constituted an undue burden on Defendant’s business operations. The Court rejected Defendant’s argument that the accommodation offered to Hadith was reasonable because another Muslim woman had previously accepted Defendant’s similar offer of allowing her to wear a skirt that fell no more than five inches below the knee over the pants of the driver's uniform. The Court was unpersuaded and pointed out that the other Muslim driver and Hadith were not interchangeable for purposes of Title VII because two members of the same religion may have varying religious practices and forms of religious observation. Likewise, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument that Hadith's preferred accommodation would have created an undue burden for Defendant. The Court reasoned that the EEOC had not offered any evidence whatsoever regarding the safety risk posed by Hadith's religious attire. Further, Defendant failed to identify any undue burden that would have resulted from Hadith wearing an untucked shirt, which was also part of her requested accommodation. Based on the record before it, the Court ruled that it could not conclude, as a matter of fact or law, that Hadith's requested accommodation would have resulted in a safety risk or an undue burden on Defendant. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. , 992 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2021). The EEOC filed an action on behalf of the charging party, Edward Hedican, a Seventh Day Adventist, who worked as an assistant manager, alleging that Defendant failed to provide him with the reasonable accommodation of not working on the Sabbath for his religious beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Hedican contended that in accordance with his religious beliefs, he could not work between sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday each week. Defendant was open 24-hours a day and was located in a highly tourist-heavy town, such that weekend work was often very busy, particularly during the summer months. Hedican’s supervisor determined that if Defendant were to accommodate Hedican in the assistant manager position, it would require the other seven assistant managers to work the weekend shifts that he was unable to work, shifts that all assistant managers would rather have off than be scheduled to work. Alternatively, Defendant would be required to hire an additional assistant manager at an additional expense to Defendant. Defendant determined that this accommodation was not reasonable, and it offered to Hedican the option to apply for an hourly supervisory position in which he could more definitely choose his hours. Hedican declined the offer to apply for the supervisory position, and filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The District Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Defendant’s offer for Hedican to apply for an hourly supervisor position that did not require mandatory weekend shifts would be reasonable under the guidelines of Title VII. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Title VII does not require an employer to force other managers to switch shifts with other salaried assistant managers, and requiring so would shift the duty to accommodate from Defendant onto other those other workers. The Seventh Circuit determined that if it were to rule that Defendant must revise its policy of a rotating-shift scheme for assistant managers, it would necessarily impose more than a slight burden on the company. For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Bear Creek Bible Church v. EEOC , No. 18-CV-00824, 2021 WL 5449038 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2021). The plaintiffs in this case were a nondenominational Christian Church and a for-profit Christian institution who argued that they were protected from complying with LGBTQ anti-discrimination provisions due to their sincerely held religious beliefs. The court first held that the church was exempt from Title VII. Finding that the institution did not qualify for Title VII’s statutory exemption, the court examined whether it was nevertheless protected by the RFRA, that is, whether Title VII would substantially burden its sincere exercise of religion, and whether Title VII substantially burdens the institution’s ability to conduct business in accordance with those beliefs. The court first concluded that there was “no dispute” that “[the institution] sincerely exercises its religious beliefs as embodied in its employment policies.” The court then considered whether plaintiff satisfied the test for establishing a substantial burden – i.e. , that it “(1) identif[ed] the religious exercise; (2) allege[d] that the challenged law pressures plaintiff to modify that exercise; and (3) show[ed] that the penalty for noncompliance is substantial.” The court concluded that the institution met