EEOC-Initiated Litigation - 2022 Edition

70 | EEOC-Initiated Litigation: 2022 Edition © 2022 Seyfarth Shaw LLP alleging that Defendant violated the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by paying her less than her counterpart, John Gregory Koger, a male professor who performed the same job. Following discovery, the EEOC and Defendant cross moved for summary judgment. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all the EEOC's claims. Defendant primarily argued that the record established that Davidson-Schmich and Koger did not perform the same job at the University, and even if they did perform the same job, Defendant maintained that the record established that the pay differential was based on factors other than the professors' sex. At the heart of this dispute was the question of whether Defendant discriminated against Davidson-Schmich in 2007 when it hired her as an associate professor at a salary of $72,000 and that same year hired Koger, a male professor with comparable qualifications for a lower- ranked position in the same department at a salary of $81,000. The EEOC claimed that due to the 2007 discriminatory pay differential, Defendant’s fixed pay increases failed to correct the original discrepancy in that despite both the promotions of Davidson-Schmich and Koger to full professorships, he still made approximately $28,000 more than her. Defendant asserted that the EEOC could not establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination under the EPA because Davidson-Schmich and Koger had never performed substantially equal jobs. Further, even if the EEOC met its initial burden, Defendant maintained that it could establish a legitimate and non-discriminatory basis for the pay differential. The burden then shifted back to the EEOC to show pretext for the pay differential, which Defendant contended that it had failed to establish. In denying Defendant’s motion as to the Equal Pay Act claim, the Court found that there remained a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the professors performed substantially equal jobs. The Court was not persuaded by Defendant’s position that they two did not perform comparable jobs and found a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the pay differential was based on factors other than sex. As to the Title VII claim, because the EEOC had established its disparate pay claim under the more rigorous analysis of the EPA, the Court opined that it had also met its initial burden of showing a prima facie case under Title VII. While Defendant had articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for initially paying Koger more than Davidson-Schmich, the Court determined that the EEOC had cast sufficient doubt on Defendant’s purportedly legitimate basis for the pay differential. Specifically, the Court held that it was particularly significant that there was evidence that Defendant increased male professor's salaries to close the gap between their salaries and those of comparable female professors and did not increase Davidson-Schmich's salary to close the gap between her and Koger. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the EPA and Title VII claims. As to the EEOC's motion for summary judgment on Defendant’s affirmative defenses of failure to conciliate, laches, and failure to mitigate, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the EEOC as to Defendant’s affirmative defenses of failure to conciliate and laches. However, the Court denied the EEOC’s motion as to the defense of failure to mitigate. In sum, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted the EEOC’s motion for partial summary judgment in part. 4. Religious Discrimination Cases EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. , No. 19-CV-1651, 2021 WL 3565728 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2021). The EEOC brought an action on behalf of the charging party Aliyah Hadith, a Muslim woman, asserting a claim of failure to provide religious accommodation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Defendant had extended a conditional offer of employment to Hadith, who was a bus driver in training, and informed Hadith that while she was on the job she would not be permitted to wear an untucked shirt or a loose-fitting, floor-length garment, called an abaya. Defendant’s standard training uniform consisted of gray pants, a blue shirt, a red tie, a gray jacket, and a gray cap. Defendant maintained safety requirements that a driver's uniform not hang on the ground or have any loose ends because it could potentially be snagged and lead to an injury. After learning of Defendant’s clothing requirement, Hadith withdrew from the training program. The EEOC maintained that Defendant’s stance regarding Hadith's attire was unlawful in that it failed to provide Hadith with a reasonable accommodation for her bona fide religious belief and, consequently, subjected Hadith to a constructive discharge. After discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the EEOC had not demonstrated that Hadith was subjected to an adverse employment action because she failed to comply with the uniform policy or to accept Defendant's proposed accommodation. The Court ruled that the EEOC had established a prima facie violation of Title VII in that it presented evidence that: (i) Hadith had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (ii)

RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTkwMTQ4