18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 485 Fiore, et al. v. University Of Tampa, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202307 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of full-time students and parents of students enrolled at the University of Tampa, brought a putative class action alleging claims of breach of contract (Count I), unjust enrichment (Count II), and conversion (Count III). Plaintiffs sought a pro-rated return of tuition and fees paid for the Spring 2020 semester after Defendant shifted from in-person to remote instruction during the spring 2020 academic semester in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant moved to dismiss: (i) the claims of the Parent Plaintiffs for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1); and (ii) Counts I to III for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion. The Court determined that Florida law applied to the substantive issues on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and federal law applied to the standing issue raised in Defendant’s to 12(b)(1) motion. With respect to standing, Plaintiffs’ theory was that the Parent Plaintiffs had suffered an economic loss because they would not have paid the same amount of tuition and fees on behalf of their children for online education. In support, Plaintiffs cited three state law rulings; the Court, however, noted that none of the decisions addressed standing, let alone Article III standing under federal law. The Court was unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument and relied upon similar COVID-19 tuition cases where rulings had found that parents did not have standing. In sum, because Plaintiffs had alleged no direct contractual relationship between Defendant and the Parent Plaintiffs, and the alleged contractual relationship was strictly between the students and Defendant, the Court held that the Parent Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. As to Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court denied Defendant’s motion as to the breach of contract claim in Count I, but granted the motion as to Count II for unjust enrichment and Count III for conversion. As to Plaintiffs’ fee-based unjust enrichment claims, Plaintiffs’ complaint simply alleged that the fees were meant to support programs that Defendant offered. The Court determined that these conclusory allegations that the fees did not go toward their intended purpose was insufficient to adequately state a claim where it would be inequitable for Defendant to retain such fees. As to Plaintiffs’ conversion claim, the Court pointed out that the elements of a conversion claim under Florida law were: (i) an act of dominion wrongfully asserted; (ii) over another’s property; and (iii) inconsistent with his ownership. At the same time, the Court observed that not everything that might be considered "property" can be subject to a conversion claim. Id . at *49. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that they had an ownership right to the in-person educational services they were supposed to be provided in exchange for their tuition and fee payments to Defendant. The Court determined that the “property” of which Plaintiffs claim to have been deprived was actually the money they paid for an in-person education, not the in-person education itself, which was insufficient to state a claim of conversion under Florida law. Id . at *50. For these reasons, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Fittipaldi, et al. v. Monmouth University, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103578 (D.N.J. June 1, 2021). Plaintiffs brought a putative class action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly- situated students who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 academic semester at Monmouth University. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant’s failure to provide in-person instruction in response to the COVID-19 pandemic despite Plaintiffs’ payment of full- tuition expenses constituted a breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. While prorated refunds were given for unused room contracts, meal plans, and parking fees, no such refund was given to students for tuition or other fees. In moving to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of contract, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion must be dismissed because they constituted claims for educational malpractice, which were not actionable under New Jersey law. In the alternative, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims, express and implied, must be dismissed because: (i) Plaintiffs did not plausibly identify any contract promising in-person instruction; (ii) Plaintiffs did not identify any meeting of the minds between the parties; (iii) New Jersey case law authorities had repeatedly refused to recognize the existence of an implied contractual relationship stemming from student catalogs, manuals, or handbooks; (iv) the reservation of rights provision in Defendant’s academic catalog negated Plaintiffs’ contract-based claims; and (v) Defendant’s policy on tuition and fees recognized that tuition was paid in exchange for a student’s ability to earn credits toward graduation, and not to attend school in- person. The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ traditional breach of contract claims, but allowed all other remaining claims to proceed. First, the Court agreed that New Jersey does not recognize the doctrine of educational malpractice. However, the Court pointed out that all breach of contract claims against an institution of higher education are not necessarily educational malpractice claims. As such, the Court concluded that only claims advanced by Plaintiffs suggesting that Defendant breached a duty of care or that the quality of the education