18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

416 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition savaging programs. Pursuant to that authority, Defendant established two programs, Bright Start and Bright Directions, which were trusts with Defendant serving as the trustee. Plaintiff contended that Defendant illegally charged fees against the savings pool’s assets rather than its earnings, illegally retained excess administrative fees, and illegally charged administrative fees. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that sovereign immunity did not apply because the funds in the pool were not state funds, but rather “private money illegally taken from participants and held in a segregated account” from the general revenue fund. Id . at *14. The Appellate Court rejected Plaintiff’s contention. It reasoned that Plaintiff filed the action against Defendant, in his official capacity as Treasurer, which was no different than filing a lawsuit against the state. The Appellate Court explained that although Plaintiff maintained that Defendant acted outside his authority, her allegations concerned the administration of the pool’s finances, which was within his statutory duty. The Appellate Court further noted that any claims remaining for injunctive relief were now moot, since subsequent legislative amendments to the Pool addressed the concerns Plaintiff sought in the first instance. The Appellate Court concluded that no issue of material fact existed as to whether Plaintiff was barred from seeking monetary damages by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. For these reasons, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Kim, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2021 Ill. App. LEXIS 366 (Ill App. 1st Dist. June 30, 2021). Plaintiff brought a putative class action on behalf of herself and other similarly-situated individuals with personal injury claims alleging claims of: (i) common law fraud; (ii) violation of § 143.24b of the Illinois Insurance Code (“Insurance Code”); and (iii) violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant violated Illinois law by failing to disclose the existence of an umbrella policy in response to her personal injury claims. The case arose from a brief series of communications between Plaintiff’s counsel in her personal injury case and one of Defendant’s insureds, in the course of litigation arising from an automobile accident involving Plaintiff and the insured. Plaintiff served the insured with interrogatories and production requests that demanded disclosure of, among other things, all insurance policies potentially applicable to the accident. The insured responded by disclosing her husband’s auto policy but not her umbrella policy. Plaintiff then amended her complaint against the insured to add Defendant to the underlying case and asserted proposed class claims against Defendant regarding the disclosure of the umbrella policy. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted summary judgment in Defendant’s favor. On Plaintiff’s appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. First, the Appellate Court held that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims arising from Defendant’s failure to disclose the existence of an umbrella policy pursuant to § 143.24b of the Illinois Insurance Code . In so ruling, the Appellate Court looked to the plain language of the statute, which requires the disclosure of potentially available coverage under personal private passenger automobile insurance policies, and determined that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute did not encompass umbrella policies. Additionally, the Appellate Court held that Plaintiff’s claims for common law or statutory fraud also failed because Defendant’s misstatements were not attributable to Defendant. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, statements made by the insured or her counsel in discovery could not be attributed to Defendant, which was not a party to the litigation at the time and did not sign or verify those discovery responses. Moreover, the Appellate Court concluded that neither deception nor reliance was shown in light of the Defendant’s prompt disclosure of the umbrella policy when asked for clarification. Finally, the Appellate Court held that Plaintiff lacked standing under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. A Plaintiff seeking to sue under the Consumer Act must either be a consumer or satisfy the "consumer nexus" test, which required Plaintiff to have suffered damages resulting from conduct directed toward the market, or which otherwise implicates consumer protection concerns. Id . at *8. The Appellate Court concluded that there was no consumer nexus in this case because Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the insurance policy issued by Defendant, and case law authority interpreting Illinois law had consistently rejected this theory of standing because there was no consumer nexus. For these reasons the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant. Langer, et al. v. CME Group, Inc., Case No. 14 CH 829 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of members of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) and the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”), filed a class action alleging breach of contract in connection with Defendant CME Group’s (“CMEG”) move to electronic futures and options trading that ultimately changed their trading rights and privileges and devalued their shares