18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

414 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition Plaintiffs’ mandamus claim was properly dismissed. In so holding the Supreme Court determined that the allegations in the petition disclosed with certainty that Plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support of their mandamus claim. The Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief failed because the petition and exhibits showed that Defendants’ exemption decision was founded on evidence that the stadium company’s interest constituted a usufruct and Defendants did not exercise their discretion in a manner that would constitute a gross abuse of duty . Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show any legal basis for injunctive relief. Finally, in light of the trial court’s correct conclusion that Defendants did not rely on an exemption allegedly expressed in OCGA § 10-9-10, but rather a determination that StadCo’s interest was a non-taxable usufruct, the Supreme Court concluded that it need not reach the trial court’s alternative ruling on the merits of Plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. RCC Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC v. Allen, et al., 2021 Ga. LEXIS 726 (Ga. Dec. 14, 2021). Plaintiff filed a class action alleging negligence, premises liability, false imprisonment, conversion, and violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) in connection with Defendants’ hiring of third- parties to place boots on vehicles parked on Defendants’ property and requiring the vehicles owners to pay a fee in order to have the boots removed so that they could operate their vehicles. The trial court previously had granted class certification for a class of “all persons who have been booted, and have paid a fine for removal of said device” at Defendants’ locations. Id . at *4. The trial court found that “the act of placing a boot on a vehicle and refusing to remove it until payment is received is the imposition of a lien on that vehicle,” and “such a lien cannot exist at common law as lien laws are in derogation of the common law.” Id . The trial court thus determined that the claims of the class members involved the common question of whether Defendants had “a legal right to immobilize vehicles at the subject properties.” Id . On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Court of Appeals determined that: (i) the trial court did not err in concluding that there was no right to immobilize a vehicle absent an enabling statute or ordinance; and (ii) the trial court properly found that liability could be determined by looking to Defendants’ conduct. Id . at *5. On a further appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court thereafter granted Defendants’ petition for certiorari to address whether a common law right exists allowing a private property owner to immobilize a vehicle parked on its property without permission. Id . Defendants argued that private property owners were permitted to immobilize vehicles that are trespassing on their property under the common law doctrine of “distress damage feasant.” Id . at *6. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It determined that the doctrine was very narrow and only applied to trespassing livestock causing actual damage to property. Even if the doctrine could be applied to the facts in this case, the Supreme Court opined that Defendants’ argument would still fail because the common law right required a trespass and proof of actual damage, which was not present here. Id . at *12-13. Turning to the issue of class certification, Defendants asserted that the legal status of the class members was an issue of fact that must be resolved for each individual case of booting. Id . at *13. The Supreme Court concluded that: (i) placing a boot on a vehicle and refusing to remove it until a fee is paid was asserting a lien on that vehicle; (ii) liens must be granted by statute or ordinance; and (iii) it was undisputed that no statute or ordinance gave Defendants the authority to boot vehicles. Id . at *13-14. Thus, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court’s determination that liens could not exist at common law because “lien laws are in derogation of the common law” was incorrect. Id . at *14. The Supreme Court explained that the trial court’s conclusion about the legal status of the class members might ultimately be correct, but it must reach that conclusion by applying the correct law. The Supreme Court reasoned that to the extent the Court of Appeals found that the existence of a common law right was the same as a statute or ordinance that might have displaced it, that holding was in error. Id . at *15. Therefore, for these reasons, the Supreme Court vacated the ruling affirming class certification and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings. Id . (iv) Illinois Enriquez, et al. v. Navy Pier, Inc., Case No. 2020-CH-7340 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2021). Plaintiff filed a class action alleging that Defendant’s use of a biometric fingerprint scanner violated § § 15(b) and 15(d) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) by not properly obtaining Plaintiff’s informed consent prior to collecting biometric information and disclosing it to third-parties, and by not publishing any written biometric retention policy. The General Assembly of Illinois had created the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority (“MPEA”), which was a local government unit. MPEA transferred operational responsibility for the pier to