18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 401 than they would have received under the weighted average method, the Court of Appeal held that Defendants did not violate California law by using the rate-in-effect method. For these reasons, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Malaspna, et al. v. Maplebear Inc., 2021 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5216 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 12, 2021). Plaintiff, a shopper for Defendant’s online platform, brought a putative class action asserting two claims of violations of California labor law, as well as a claim for civil penalties under Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”). Through its app, Defendant connected “shoppers,” like Plaintiff, with consumers seeking grocery shopping and delivery services. Before offering these services to consumers, Plaintiff was required to download Defendant’s app and complete the registration process, which included signing an Independent Contractor Agreement (“Agreement”) that included an Arbitration Provision that required all disputes, claims, or controversies arising out of or relating to the services performed to be resolved by final and binding arbitration. Additionally, the Arbitration Provision included a waiver of representative action claims, which provided that each party could only bring and pursue claims against the other in their individual capacities. Defendant moved to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual basis and to stay the trial court’s proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to compel on the basis that the PAGA waiver was unenforceable pursuant to Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC ., 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014). While Defendant recognized that the California Supreme Court held in Iskanian that PAGA waivers in arbitration agreements were unenforceable on public policy grounds, Defendant argued that subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S. Ct. 1612 ( Epic Systems ), and Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 139 S. Ct. 1407 ( Lamps Plus ), overruled Iskanian . On Defendant’s appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order holding and determined that it properly denied Defendant’s motion to compel. Defendant argued that Epic Systems and Lamps Plus addressed the same question as Iskanian – enforceability of a PAGA waiver – but decided it differently. Therefore, Defendant maintained that because there was a conflict between federal and state law, Iskanian did not control the outcome of the appeal. The Court of Appeal rejected Defendant’s attempts to analogize the FLSA’s private remedial function and public law enforcement function to the PAGA, and determined that the principles set forth in Epic Systems regarding waiver of the right to bring a collective action under the FLSA did not apply to a PAGA claim. As such, the Court of Appeal determined that neither Epic Systems nor Lamps Plus addressed the same PAGA waiver issue decided in Iskanian, and therefore Iskanian did control the outcome of the appeal. In sum, the Court of Appeal concluded the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Epic Systems or Lamps Plus did not decide the same PAGA waiver question differently than the California Supreme Court did in Iskanian , and therefore there was no conflict to reconcile. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal followed the decision of the California Supreme Court in Iskanian and concluded the PAGA waiver in the parties’ agreement was unenforceable. For these reasons, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Medina, et al. v. United Airlines, Inc., 2021 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5463 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 24, 2021). Plaintiff, an airline mechanic, brought a representative action under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) premised on a single claim that Defendant violated § 226.7 of the California Labor Code (“CLC”), the meal break requirement, by failing to provide a second meal break to its California mechanics who worked shifts of over 10 hours. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant engaged in willful violations of the CLC by creating and maintaining policies, practices, and customs that knowingly denied employees their meal break rights. The terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) negotiated and approved under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), which regulates labor relations between common interstate air carriers and their employees. Section 226.7, in conjunction with California Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order No. 9-2001, prohibits an employer from requiring and employee to work for a period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes. However, if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff’s action was preempted by the Railway Labor Act’s (“RLA”) minor dispute preemption because adjudicating his claim would require the trial court to interpret provisions of the mechanics’ CBA. Defendant further argued that Plaintiff’s action was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”) and barred by the dormant commerce clause of the U.S.