18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 385 elsewhere. Because these facts were potentially material to the drivers’ status under the MWA and § 608, the Supreme Court declined to decide as a matter of law whether the drivers were employees under either law. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and remanded for further proceedings. (x) Pennsylvania In re Amazon.com Fulfillment Center Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA ” ) & Wage & Hour Litigation, 2021 Penn. LEXIS 3047 (Penn. July 21, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of workers at a warehouse fulfillment center, brought a class action alleging violations of Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), in that they were entitled to compensation for their unpaid time spent in Defendant’s required security screening process. Defendant removed the suit to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and thereafter, it was consolidated by the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (“MDL”) in the Western District of Kentucky with other similar class actions brought in other states, such as Kentucky, California, Arizona, and Nevada, under those states’ minimum wage laws, as well as combined with actions brought under the FLSA. After Plaintiffs’ appealed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to the PMWA claims, the Sixth Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, including: (i) whether time spent on an employer’s premises waiting to undergo, and undergoing, mandatory security screening is compensable as “hours worked” within the meaning of the ("PMWA"); and (ii) whether the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex , as described in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. , 328 U.S. 680 (1946), applies to bar claims brought under the PMWA. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania answered the two questions by concluding that time spent on an employer’s premises waiting to undergo, and undergoing, mandatory security screening constituted hours worked under the PMWA, and there was no de minimis exception to the PMWA. As to the first question, the Supreme Court rejected Defendant’s contention that only time in which employees are required to be on their premises “working” – i.e. , engaged in duties or tasks directly related to the specific requirements of their job or occupation – can constitute “hours worked” for purposes of the PMWA. The Supreme Court looked to the plain language of § 231.1 which provides that “hours worked” includes all “time during which an employee is required by the employer to be on the premises of the employer” as compensable hours worked, regardless of whether the employee is actually performing job-related duties while on the premises. Id . at *12. Thus, the Supreme Court determined that for purposes of the PMWA, time spent on an employer’s premises waiting to undergo, and undergoing, mandatory security screening constituted hours worked. Likewise, the Supreme Court determined that when the text of the PMWA was read consistent with its legislatively articulated purpose – to maintain the economic well-being of the Commonwealth’s workforce by ensuring that each and every Pennsylvania worker is paid for all time he or she is required to expend by an employer for its own purposes – it discerned no intent on the part of the legislature to allow a de minimis exception to the PMWA’s requirements. (xi) West Virginia Fairmont Tool, Inc. v. Davis, et al., 2021 W.Va. LEXIS 654 (W.Va. Nov. 22, 2021). Plaintiff filed a class action alleging that Defendant made improper withholdings from the wages of its employees in violation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act (“WPCA”). The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. It found that Defendant violated the WPCA. The trial court ruled that the withholdings were within the definition of an assignment as identified in the WPCA, but Defendant never procured from its employees a writing that complied with the conditions set in the WPCA. The trial court entered orders that awarded the employees the wages improperly taken from their paychecks, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The trial court had found no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant paid its employees less than the full amount of their wages because it made reductions to its employees’ paychecks for uniforms, boots, and tools. Id . at *657. Furthermore, the trial court found that Defendant could not produce any valid, written wage assignment satisfying the requirements of § 21-5-3(e) of the West Virginia Code showing that either Plaintiff or other the class members had properly authorized these reductions to their wages. The Supreme Court of Appeals explained that the West Virginia Legislature recently tied the definition of “assignment” in the WPCA with that of the Consumer Credit and Protection Act, making it clear that an "assignment" meant all forms of assignments or deductions from an employee’s wages, except those withholdings that met the definition of an "authorized deduction." Id . Defendant