18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

220 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition representative. The Court looked to the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement that it found plainly covered the situation in which the opt-ins now found themselves, i.e ., pressing their ADEA claims in a putative class and collective action after having consented to opt-in. The Court ruled that any former employee who had signed a separation agreement containing the class and collective action waiver could not opt-in to the suit for any reason. The Court also dismissed those opt-in Plaintiffs who had already pursued their ADEA claims in individual arbitration. For these reason, the Court granted Defendant’s motions to compel arbitration. Saxon, et al. v. Southwest Airlines Co. , 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9370 (7th Cir. March 31, 2021). Plaintiff, a ramp supervisor, filed a collective action alleging that Defendant failed to pay supervisors overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) signed each year to continue employment. The District Court granted Defendant’s motion and compelled Plaintiff to submit her claims to arbitration. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the District Court’s ruling. Plaintiff argued that ramp supervisors were exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) as they were part of a "class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," and therefore exempted by § 1 of the FAA. The District Court ruled that the "linchpin" of the transportation-worker definition was "actual transportation, not merely handling goods . . . at one end or the other" of a network, and thus the exemption did not apply to Plaintiff. Id . at *4. The Seventh Circuit looked to the text of § 1 to examine whether Plaintiff was part of a class of workers who were engaged in commerce. The Seventh Circuit noted that to be engaged in commerce for purposes of § 1, a worker must "perform work analogous to that of seamen and railroad employees, whose occupations are centered on the transport of goods in interstate and foreign commerce." Id . at *5. The Seventh Circuit opined that to be exempted under the residual clause of § 1, the ramp supervisors must themselves be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and therefore must be actively occupied in "the enterprise of moving goods across interstate lines." Id . at *9. The Seventh Circuit determined that since a central part of ramp supervisors’ job was the loading and unloading of cargo for planes on interstate and international flights, they would fall under the definition of working in interstate or foreign commerce. Id . at *9-10. Defendant argued that loading and unloading cargo was not enough to make a worker engaged in commerce because that phrase was only in reference to "actual transportation." Id . at *10. Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with that point, it also found that the actual transportation as not limited to the precise moment either goods or the people accompanying them cross state lines. Id . at *10-11. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that loading and unloading cargo onto a vehicle so that it may be moved interstate should be considered actual transportation as they were an essential part of the enterprise of transporting goods between states and countries. Id . at *11. The Seventh Circuit thus concluded that airplane cargo loaders were part of a class of workers engaged in commerce and therefore should be considered transportation workers whose contract of employment was exempt from the FAA. The Seventh Circuit therefore reversed and remanded the District Court’s ruling. Sheppard, et al. v. Staffmark Investment, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34726 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2021). Plaintiff, a temporary worker, brought a putative wage & hour class action alleging violations of California labor law including failure to provide meal periods and rest breaks as well as a claim under Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”). Plaintiff was placed by Defendant Staffmark Investment, LLC (“Staffmark”) on a temporary work assignment at UPSMI, a company that provided domestic and international high-volume mailing services. Plaintiff’s job at Defendant UPS Mail Innovations, Inc. (“UPSMI”) was as a sorter, and her duties included removing mail from the conveyer belt, hand sorting the mail based upon zip code, and then placing the mail in the appropriate mail bag. Although Plaintiff was staffed at other work locations while employed by Staffmark, all of Plaintiff’s claims arose from her employment while she was assigned at UPSMI. Defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement, and the Court granted the motion. Plaintiff did not contest the fact that she willingly and knowingly signed the Arbitration Agreement as part of the onboarding process and that the scope of the Arbitration Agreement encompassed the employment claims at issue in her complaint. Rather, Plaintiff argued that she was exempt from the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) under Section 1 as a transportation worker. Section 1 of the FAA contains a transportation worker exemption, which exempts from coverage of the FAA all "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. at *4. Plaintiff argued that transportation workers, including postal workers such as herself, were exempt from the provisions of the FAA under Section 1. Defendants asserted that the Section 1 transportation worker exemption did not apply because Plaintiff’s duties