EEOC-Initiated Litigation - 2022 Edition

© 2022 Seyfarth Shaw LLP EEOC-Initiated Litigation: 2022 Edition | 65 in a predominantly Black, higher-crime area was objectively degrading, as supervisors informed Black drivers that they were assigned to such routes based solely on their skin color, and one driver alleged that he was laughed at by white drivers who bragged that they never had to drive routes in such areas. Id. at 68. Moreover, when Black drivers complained to supervisors based on their observations that white drivers were not assigned to routes in predominantly Black, higher-crime areas, supervisors tried minimize the complaints. Id. at 69. Aside from the claims of several drivers, the Court ruled that the EEOC sufficiently established a triable issue as to whether being assigned routes in a higher-crime area was a significantly negative work condition that might fairly be characterized as objectively creating a hardship on the driver’s employment conditions. The Court also determined that the EEOC created sufficient issues of fact as to whether being assigned to a route that required significantly more arduous work constituted an adverse employment action. The Court likewise found evidence of pretext, as Defendant could not provide evidence that it honestly believed that the routes at issue were assigned based on legitimate, non- discriminatory factors. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the EEOC’s claims and the remaining intervenors’ discrimination claims. EEOC v. JBS USA LLC , No. 10-CV-2103, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13012 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2021). The EEOC brought a lawsuit alleging a meatpacking plant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion. On August 8, 2011, the Court issued an order bifurcating the case. Id . at *5. Phase I of the trial was to address three issues, including: (i) whether Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawfully denying Muslim employees reasonable religious accommodations to pray and break their Ramadan fast from December 2007 through July 2011; (ii) whether Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of disciplining employees on the basis of their race, national origin, or religion during Ramadan 2008; and (iii) whether Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of retaliating against a group of black, Muslim, Somali employees for engaging in protected activity in opposition to discrimination during Ramadan 2008. The Court presided over a 16-day trial for Phase I from August 7 to August 31, 2017. Id . at *6. On September 24, 2018, the Court issued its Phase I Findings. Id . It found that: (i) while Defendant had denied Muslim employees a reasonable religious accommodation to pray during Ramadan (other than in 2009 and 2010), the EEOC had not made a requisite showing that any employees suffered a materially adverse employment action as a result of Defendant’s policy denying unscheduled prayer breaks; (ii) the EEOC had failed to prove that Defendant’s disciplinary actions during Ramadan 2008 were motivated by a discriminatory animus; and (iii) the EEOC had failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s discipline of employees during Ramadan 2008 was for a retaliatory purpose rather for engaging in a work stoppage. As a result, the Court dismissed the EEOC’s Phase I pattern or practice claims. Id . at *7. The EEOC moved the Court to reconsider, which the Court denied. The EEOC had asked the Court to reconsider its findings pursuant to the Tenth Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Exby-Stolley v. Board Of County Commissioners, 979 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2020), an ADA disability-accommodation case. The EEOC argued that Exby-Stolley was an intervening change in Title VII religious accommodation law. The Court opined that Exby-Stolley was an ADA case where the jury was instructed that, in order for the Plaintiff to make out an ADA accommodation claim, the Plaintiff had to show that she had suffered an adverse employment action. Id . at *8-9. In holding that the ADA did not require Plaintiff to prove she suffered an adverse employment action, the Tenth Circuit compared the elements of an ADA accommodation claim with a religious accommodation claim brought under Title VII. Exby-Stolley explained that, while ADA claims do not require that a Plaintiff show an adverse employment action, in Title VII religious accommodation cases the prima facie case requires the employee to show among other things that “he or she was fired or not hired for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Id . at *9. The Court explained that in its Phase I Findings, and as the Tenth Circuit stated in Exby-Stolley, the adverse employment action requirement for Title VII religious-accommodation claims “is not new.” Id . at *10. The Tenth Circuit explained the fact that a disparate treatment claim “would require an adverse employment action is wholly unremarkable.’” Id . at *10. Accordingly, the Court held that the