EEOC-Initiated Litigation - 2022 Edition

62 | EEOC-Initiated Litigation: 2022 Edition © 2022 Seyfarth Shaw LLP a motion for summary judgment, and the Court denied the motion. The Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Due to Jansma’s homonymous hemianopsia, Defendant had concerns as to whether he could perform the essential duties of his job, including being able to thoroughly exam patients’ eyes, and see the entire surface and internal structures of the eyes without missing areas of concern. Defendant had offered Jansma two alternatives, including: (i) resign; or (ii) continue employment on leave and undergo a medical evaluation to determine whether he could safely perform his job duties. Id . at *5. Jansma agreed to undergo a medical evaluation. Thereafter, Jansma received from Defendant a questionnaire for the doctor to answer and an authorization for the release of medical information. The questionnaire directed the evaluator to answer questions such as "Does Dr. Jansma have a physical or mental impairment? If so, please describe such impairment(s) in detail;” and to authorize a designated entity "to release or disclose health information to Defendant. Id . at *6. Jansma objected to both, and did not provide results of an exam or medical records to Defendant; as a result, he was ultimately terminated from his employment. The EEOC alleged that the examination and request for all health information was not sufficiently narrow in scope, and thus was discriminatory under the ADA. The Court agreed. It found that the EEOC established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the disability inquiry and the medical release were properly limited in scope. The Court opined that viewing the record in the light most favorable to the EEOC, the exam and questionnaire (the disability inquiry) did not limit the information sought by Defendant to its concerns about Jansma's homonymous hemianopsia. Id . at *21. The Court explained that the questionnaire asked broad questions regarding whether or not Jansma had an impairment, which left open the possibility that Jansma had more than one impairment, even though Defendant had concerns about only one disability. Id . at *21-22. The Court found that Defendant’s inquiry was not job-related and consistent with business necessity. The Court also held that the medical record release was overly broad, as the doctor would have obtained any health information from Jansma and any of Jansma's medical records, and would be authorized to release that information to Defendant. The Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendant had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Jansma. The Court reasoned that Defendant terminated Jansma at least in part because he would not submit to its demands, and if the termination was not proper, Jansma suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of his disability. Id . at *24. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. EEOC v. Charter Communications LLC , No. 18-CV-1333-BHL, 2021 WL 5988637 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2021). The EEOC brought an action on behalf of the charging party, James Kimmons, a call center representative, alleging that Defendant failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court denied the EEOC’s motion and granted Defendant’s motion. Kimmons worked as a retention representative scheduled for nine-hour shifts each work day, and lived approximately one hour from the call center. Kimmons alleged that he suffered from cataracts, which made driving at night difficult. Id . at *3. Accordingly, Kimmons submitted a request for an accommodation for a shift that would allow him to avoid driving to or from work in the dark. In response, Defendant approved Kimmons for a temporary, 30-day shift change, allowing him to work the 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m, rather than his previously scheduled noon to 9 p.m. shift. Kimmons requested a 30-day extension on his temporary shift change, which Defendant denied. The EEOC asserted that Defendant’s denial of the shift change was discriminatory on the basis of Kimmons’ disability. Defendant argued that it was not required to accommodate Kimmons when he could perform all the essential functions of his job, and even if it was required to accommodate him, Kimmons' accommodation requests were unreasonable because they would have been ineffective. Id . at *5. The EEOC asserted that Defendant unreasonably denied Kimmons an accommodation to which he was entitled under the ADA, and Defendant failed to adduce sufficient facts to support an undue hardship defense. Id . at *6. For purposes of the motion, the Court assumed that Kimmons' alleged night blindness could constitute a disability under the ADA. Id . at *7. The EEOC contended that the ADA imposes a duty on employers to grant reasonable and non-burdensome accommodations permitting an employee to arrive at work, even where the proposed accommodation did not relate to an essential function of the employee's job. Defendant claimed that the ADA did not require an employer to accommodate a disability unrelated to the employee's ability to perform his job's essential functions. Id . at *9. The Court explained that the Seventh Circuit had resolved this same dispute previously, finding that an employer's accommodation duty was “triggered only in situations where an individual who is qualified on paper requires an accommodation in order to be able to perform the essential