EEOC-Initiated Litigation - 2022 Edition

© 2022 Seyfarth Shaw LLP EEOC-Initiated Litigation: 2022 Edition | 57 failed to allege specific facts to establish a claim for retaliation under Title VII. The Court noted that the EEOC’s allegations, when viewed in their totality, were sufficient to state a viable claim for relief under Title VII. Further, the Court explained that although the EEOC did not specify in its complaint whether the supervisor was claimant’s actual supervisor, employer liability may still be established if the employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment, and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action. Id. at 5. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the hostile work environment claim. The Court also rejected Defendant’s argument that the complaint failed to allege specific facts to establish a claim for retaliation under Title VII. Id. at 6. The Court disagreed with Defendant’s position. It opined that protected activity includes “complaining to anyone (management, unions, other employees, or newspapers) about allegedly unlawful practices.” Id. at 6. The Court held that the EEOC properly plead a materially adverse employment action since the claimant was sent home, and that the EEOC sufficiently plead that a causal link existed between the protected activity (complaining about harassment) and the adverse employment action (being sent home). Accordingly, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the retaliation claim. 2. Other Procedural Attacks EEOC v. Hunter-Tannersville Central School District , No. 21-CV-0352, 2021 WL 5711995 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2021). The EEOC filed an action alleging on behalf of the charging party, Dr. Susan Vickers, a school district superintendent, alleging that Defendant paid Dr. Vickers less and provided less favorable benefits than the previous male superintendent in violation of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). Defendant filed an answer asserting various affirmative defenses. The EEOC moved to strike Defendant’s affirmative defense that any differential in pay that Plaintiff is able to identify was the result of a job related factors other than sex, as permitted by 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv)," and the "other than sex" factor was the ability to negotiate a higher salary. Id . at *2. The Court denied the motion. The Court explained that the EEOC must establish a prima facie case to prove an EPA violation by establishing three elements: "(i) the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex; (ii) the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and (iii) the jobs are performed under similar work conditions." Id . at *4. If established, the burden then shifts to the employer to offer a reason as to why the compensation differs, which it can do by showing that the difference in compensation results from: "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." Id . at *5. The EEOC contended that Defendant’s affirmative defense was legally insufficient in that contract negotiations were not “related to the performance of the Superintendent job." Id . Defendant argued that the affirmative defense was legally sufficient because neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit have ever held that negotiation was not a "factor other than sex" that an employer could rely upon to defend against an EPA claim. Id . at *6. Further, Defendant pointed to the fact that there were at least two circuit courts and multiple federal district courts that have specifically held that “negotiation issues” was a valid defense. Id . The EEOC responded that decisions outside of the Second Circuit did not require that a "factor other than sex" be "job-related," and no circuit case law authority previously had held that negotiations were a job- related factor that would justify a pay disparity under the EPA. Id . The Court opined that at this early stage in the proceedings, it was not convinced that only job-related factors could constitute a "factor other than sex." Id . The Court reasoned that the EEOC did not meet its burden to show that Defendant’s affirmative defense was insufficient because there was a question of law, which might provide success on the merits to Defendant. For these reasons, the Court denied the EEOC’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses. B. Discovery In EEOC Cases 1. Motions To Compel, Entries Of Confidentiality And Protective Orders, And Other Discovery Procedures EEOC v. Yale New Haven Hospitals, Inc. , No. 20-CV-00187, 2021 WL 5235274 (D. Conn. Nov. 10, 2021). The EEOC filed an enforcement action alleging that Defendant’s “Late Career Practitioner Policy” - requiring neurophysiological and ophthalmologic examinations for its employees - was discriminatory and

RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTkwMTQ4