EEOC-Initiated Litigation - 2022 Edition

56 | EEOC-Initiated Litigation: 2022 Edition © 2022 Seyfarth Shaw LLP sanctionable about the EEOC’s actions. Id. at 7. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for sanctions. EEOC v. K&L Auto Crushers , No. 20-CV-00455, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20248, (E.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2021). The EEOC brought an enforcement action against Defendant on behalf of the charging party, Claudia Vestal, alleging violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The EEOC asserted that Defendant discriminated against Vestal by failing or refusing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, and terminating her because of her disability (cancer) in violation 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Specifically, the complaint alleged that Vestal sought modifications of a work schedule for the time she was undergoing chemotherapy, which Defendant either denied or to which it never responded. The EEOC sought: (i) a permanent injunction to enjoin Defendant from basing any employment decision on an employee’s disability; and (ii) back-pay, compensation for past and future pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, and punitive damages for Defendant' malicious and reckless conduct. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant argued that Plaintiff had not sufficiently made a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendant contended that: (i) Vestal did not request any specific reasonable accommodation for her disability and that her complaint failed to allege that she requested accommodations; (ii) Vestal had not alleged that she provided a specific date for her anticipated return to work; (iii) indefinite leave was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA; and (iv) the EEOC did not sufficiently allege that Vestal was a qualified individual under the ADA. The Court denied Defendant’s motion. It noted that the bulk of the motion disputed facts and evidentiary issues that were more properly considered at the summary judgment stage. The Court opined that all that was required was that the EEOC plead enough facts to state a claim that was plausible on its face. The Court agreed with the EEOC’s position that Defendant misrepresented the contents of the complaint, most notably on the issues of whether Vestal requested accommodation. Finally, the Court rejected Defendant's argument that the complaint should be dismissed because it failed to make a showing of each prong of the prima facie test for discrimination. The Court agreed with the EEOC that Defendant’s argument failed to account for the Supreme Court's holding in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002). Under Swierkiewicz and its progeny, the EEOC's complaint should not be dismissed if it does not allege facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. To survive a motion to dismiss, the pleadings need only give Defendant fair notice of the basis of the discrimination claim. As such, the Court concluded that the EEOC had met its burden to state a claim that Vestal was qualified individual under the ADA. The Court determined that Vestal’s assertion that she requested a modified schedule with the ability to appear in person and then requested the ability to work from home implied that Vestal believed that she could perform the essential functions of her job or that she could do so with an accommodation. In sum, the Court ruled that the EEOC’s allegations were enough to provide Defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rested. Likewise, as to the failure to accommodate claim, given the similarity of the elements in both claims, the Court also found that the EEOC had pled enough facts to sufficiently allege a failure to accommodate claim. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. EEOC v. Konos Inc. , No. 20-CV-973 (W.D. Mich. June 3, 2021). The EEOC filed an enforcement action on behalf of a claimant against her employer, alleging it subjected to her to a hostile work environment and retaliation after she was sent home for complaining about a supervisor’s sexual harassment. Defendant brought a motion to dismiss both claims, which the Court denied. It found that when taking all factual allegations as true, the EEOC’s complaint sufficiently plead violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The claimant started working for Defendant on or about April 12, 2017, as an egg inspector at its facility in Martin, Michigan. Id. at 1. Shortly thereafter, a supervisor allegedly began sexually harassing the claimant. The harassment included text messages soliciting an intimate relationship, which she rejected. In addition, the supervisor sexually assaulted her on three separate occasions, including forced kissing, groping, and vaginal penetration. The claimant reported the assault to Defendant and the police, and obtained a personal protection order against the supervisor. Thereafter, the supervisor was prosecuted and pled no contest to fourth degree criminal sexual conduct. After the claimant complained about the alleged sexual harassment, Defendant the sent the claimant home, and she never returned to work. The EEOC’s lawsuit alleged that: (i) Defendant violated Title VII by subjecting the claimant to a hostile work environment; and (ii) that it violated Title VII by retaliating against her for objecting to and complaining about a sexually hostile work environment. Id. at 2. In moving to dismiss both claims, Defendant asserted that the EEOC failed to allege specific facts demonstrating a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, and