©2025 Seyfarth Shaw LLP Developments in Equal Pay Litigation 2025 | 79 The court held that those allegations would suffice at the motion to dismiss stage under both statutes, holding that joint-employment was a fact-specific inquiry best left to summary judgment.610 When plaintiffs sue under Title VII or state laws, different tests may be used. For example, in Noble v. Gould Medical Group, Inc.,611 a physician brought a range of discrimination claims under federal, state, and common law. The claims were brought against a group of distinct healthcare entities, which were corporate affiliates of each other, used the same corporate branding, and reported to a single CEO. The court first held that “[t]here is a presumption that separate corporate entities have distinct identities, and plaintiffs bear a heavy burden under both California and federal law when they seek to rebut this presumption and hold multiple corporate entities liable as a single employer.”612 The Plaintiff was relying on an integrated enterprise theory to establish joint liability, which looks to four factors: (1) the interrelation of operations between the two entities; (2) whether they share common management; (3) the degree to which centralized control of labor relations exists; and (4) whether there is common ownership or financial control.613 But the court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant group hired him, set his compensation, or maintained his employment records. Nor did he allege that any entity other than his direct employer imposed any discipline on him. The court concluded: “’The key question in the integrated enterprise inquiry is who is responsible for the employment decisions at issue, and Plaintiff has alleged no facts to suggest that [Defendants] played any role in the decisions’ alleged in the [complaint].”614 Although these joint-employment issues more typically involve different corporate entities, the EPA’s definition of an “employer” is broad enough to include individual managers or supervisors who are shown to exercise substantial control over the plaintiff’s terms of compensation and work activities.615 For example, in Malik v. Wyoming Valley Medical Center,616 a physician sought to hold her employer, a medical center, and a manager of the medical center, liable for alleged equal pay violations. At issue was whether she had adequately alleged that the manager was an “employer” under the EPA and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The court held that she had, because she had alleged that he was a “high-level manager” at the organization, that he personally managed and oversaw her work, that he had the authority to discipline and counsel her, and that he had a hand in her removal from her position, her non-hiring for another position, and her suspension and termination.617 Viewed in the light most favorable 610 Id. at *7. Similarly, in Jafri v. Signal Funding LLC, No. 19-cv-645, 2019 WL 4824883 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2019), the Chief Operating Officer of a financial company brought a claim under the federal and Illinois Equal Pay Acts, alleging she was paid less than five of her male subordinates. Id. at *1. The complaint was brought against plaintiff’s employer entity, as well as affiliated entities and the founder and Managing Partner of the corporate parent of those affiliated entities. Id. The employer argued that the complaint failed to allege that the affiliated entities had any control over plaintiff’s pay. Id. at *4. However, the district court held that, “the allegation that she was employed by these entities is sufficient to plausibly allege that the entities had some control over her pay. This is particularly so when one individual—defendant [founder]—owns all three entities and is alleged to have directed [plaintiff] to move from Illinois to Florida in order to be able to more effectively work for all three entities.” Id. The district court therefore allowed the case to proceed to discovery in order to determine, among other things, whether each of the defendants had the alleged control over plaintiff’s compensation. Id. 611 Noble v. Gould Med. Group, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-01433-MCE-CKD, 2022 WL 3718036 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2022). 612 Id. at *4 (quoting Rhodes v. Sutter Health, No. 2:12-cv-0013 WBS DAD, 2012 WL 1868697, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2012)). 613 Id. at *5. 614 Id. (quoting Rhodes, 2012 WL 1868697, at *7). 615 Some employers have argued that individual liability cannot be alleged along with entity liability, with some success. See, e.g., Weaver v. Jackson, HMA, LLC, No. 3:22-cv-151-HTW-LGI, 2023 WL 1787169, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 6, 2023) (dismissing claim against supervisor because it was a “remedial redundancy,” meaning that the plaintiff already has the same claim against the employer under the EPA and, since double recovery for the same alleged acts of discrimination is disallowed, any further relief against an individual would be redundant and subject to dismissal); but see Cooper v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 21-cv-02411-PABNYW, 2022 WL 2063229, at *8 (D. Colo. June 8, 2022) (holding that plaintiff’s proposed amendment to the complaint to, among other things, add EPA claims against two individual defendants was not futile, noting some precedent to support defendant’s argument that an employee “may only assert an Equal Pay Act claim against the entity or her individual supervisors, but not both,” but holding that there was a split of authority and lack of clear, binding precedent, such that: “the court cannot conclude that the present state of the law is so clear that it renders Plaintiff's Proposed Claims . . . patently futile”). 616 Malik v. Wyo. Valley Med. Ctr., No. 3:19-cv-01547, 2020 WL 3412692 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2020). 617 Id. at *3.
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