148 | 2025 Cal-Peculiarities ©2025 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 274 Hildebrandt v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 58 Cal. App. 5th 128, 136-39 (2020) (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103 (1988)). 275 Hildebrandt, 58 Cal. App. 5th at 139-45. 276 Id. 277 See, e.g., Civ. Code § 1624(a). 278 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 673 (1988) (citing White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 343-44 (1968)). 279 See Civ. Code § 1624(a)(1): “The following contracts are invalid unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent: (1) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof.” 280 See, e.g., Sciborski v. Pac. Bell Directory, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1152 (2012) (to invoke LMRA preemption, defendant must show claim “cannot be resolved on the merits without choosing among competing interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement and its application to the claim”; CBA interpretation not needed to resolve claim that employer unlawfully used self-help to deduct funds from wages already paid, upon the employer’s unilateral declaration that a commission was unearned) 281 Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1054 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting LMRA preemption argument because, although claims depended on language of CBA, the claims did not substantially depend on a CBA interpretation and could “be resolved by—at most— merely ‘looking to’ the CBAs”). 282 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). 283 San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). 284 Doe v. Google, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 5th 948 (2020). 285 Id. at 960-61. 286 Id. at 963. 287 Id. at 968-69. 288 Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1)(3), (c)(2). SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. For cases granting plaintiffs’ anti-SLAPP motions, see Aber v. Comstock, 212 Cal. App. 4th 931 (2013) (upholding anti-SLAPP order against alleged sexual harasser who sued plaintiff for defamation and IIED); cf. Cho v. Chang, 219 Cal. App. 4th 521 (2013) (striking in part alleged harasser’s crosscomplaint for defamation and IIED). 289 Aber v. Comstock, 212 Cal. App. 4th 931 (2013). 290 Id. at 939. 291 Id. at 941-953. 292 AB 3070, adding Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7. 293 Id. 294 Id. 295 Id. 296 Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7(g). 297 King v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 53 Cal. App. 5th 675, 730-31 (2020) (the court “cannot find … that the jury awarded the same damages for the defamation and wrongful termination claims” as there was substantial evidence that plaintiff’s reputation had been affected by defamatory statements following his termination). 298 See Davis v. Consol. Freightways, 29 Cal. App. 4th 354, 373 (1994) (there was no basis to find self-compelled publication where no strong compulsion to disclose theft accusation existed, because the former employer had a strict policy against giving prospective employers any information about former employees beyond the dates of their employment). 299 Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 5th 521, 549-550 (2020) (“The jury concluded that Tilkey was under strong pressure to communicate Allstate’s defamatory statement to another person. There is ample evidence to support this conclusion” as the reason for termination reported on the Form U5 was negative, and employers have access to U5 forms, which meant that Tilkey would have to explain the situation to any prospective employer). 300 Civ. Code § 47(c). 301 McQuirk v. Donnelley, 189 F.3d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1999) (release signed by applicant authorizing former employer to provide information could not, under California law, release future intentional acts of defamation); but see Bardin v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 494, 507 (1999) (release barred defamation claims against former employer). 302 Civ. Code § 47(c). 303 Civ. Code § 47.1. 304 Id. 305 Toscano v. Greene Music, 124 Cal. App. 4th 685 (2004) (plaintiff, suing for promissory estoppel stemming from defendant’s unfulfilled alleged promise of employment, causing plaintiff to resign from at-will job at former employer, can recover what wages he would have earned from former employer through retirement, to extent that damages are not speculative); see Yaffe v. Skeen, 106 Cal. App. 5th 1281, 1319-20 (2024) (the court found the evidence was sufficient to show that the damages were not speculative, where plaintiff had been with his employer for nine years, had advanced in his department, and testified that he would have remained with his employer until he was 60).
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