©2025 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 2025 Cal-Peculiarities | 145 190 Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists, 63 Cal. App. 4th 563, 567-68, 574 (1998) (public policy forbids firing employee for complaining about deduction of wages from paycheck for a towing charge). 191 Siri v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc., 31 Cal. App. 5th 598, 605-06 (2019) (reversing summary judgment for employer; while unobtainable tax returns might strengthen plaintiff’s case, her right to recover turns only on whether she was fired for communicating a reasonable belief that defendant was violating tax law, and that could be shown without invading the implied taxpayer privilege). See also Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 916 F.3d 1176, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2019) (upholding $8 million out of $11 million whistleblower verdict for former general counsel; plaintiff need not prove actual violation of law, but rather only that employer fired employee for reporting a reasonably based suspicion of unlawful activity). 192 Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1241, 1255 (2008) (upholding judgment for employee constructively discharged because she was a potential witness in a claim for sexual harassment); Lujan v. Minagar, 124 Cal. App. 4th 1040, 1044-46 (2004) (firing employee who did not personally report suspected workplace safety violations based on fear she might do so violated Labor Code section 6310, which prohibits dismissal in retaliation for reporting OSHA violations). 193 Steele v. Youthful Offender Parole Bd., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1241, 1255 (2008). 194 Stevenson v. Superior Ct. (Huntington Mem’l Hosp.), 16 Cal. 4th 880, 905 (1997) (employee can assert common law tort for wrongful termination based on public policy forbidding age discrimination, without administrative exhaustion); Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 612 (1999) (discharge for taking CFRA leave supports tort claim for wrongful dismissal); Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc., 242 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1383 (2015) (employee may assert a public-policy tort claim for disability discrimination without satisfying FEHA’s then one-year statute of limitations). 195 Gould v. Maryland Sound Indus., Inc., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1147-8 (1995) (Labor Code section 216 expresses fundamental public policy for prompt payment of wages and forbids firing employee to avoid paying commissions earned). 196 Vasquez v. Franklin Mgmt. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 819, 828-29 (2013). 197 Galeotti v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 3, 48 Cal. App. 5th 850, 857, 863 (2020). 198 Garcia v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1556, 1158, 1562 (1986) (wrongful demotion or suspension without pay is actionable as breach of public policy), abrogated by Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1093-95 (1992) (criticized Garcia to the extent that Garcia indicated that a tort action does not need to be rooted in either a statute or a constitutional provision). 199 Touchstone Television Prod. v. Superior Ct. (Sheridan), 208 Cal. App. 4th 676, 680-82 (2012) (rejecting tort claim by “Desperate Housewives” actress that the television producer refused to renew her contract in retaliation for her raising safety concerns); Baker v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego, 2015 WL 1344958, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) (rejecting claim of wrongful termination in violation of FEHA’s public policy against disability discrimination, because California law does not recognize “a claim for tortious nonrenewal of an employment contract”); see also Daly v. Exxon Corp., 55 Cal. App. 4th 39, 45 (1997) (rejecting claim of wrongful termination for failure to renew contract that expired by its terms; use of “wrongful termination” is a “misnomer” where the “employment contract is for a fixed term and expires”); Motevalli v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 122 Cal. App. 4th 97, 113 (2004) (“The District did not terminate Motevalli—she was a probationary teacher, working under an emergency credential, whose contract was not renewed. ... Motevalli was incapable of amending her complaint to allege a new cause of action for tortious nonrenewal of her employment contract in violation of public policy because no such cause of action is recognized.”). 200 Touchstone, 208 Cal. App. 4th at 681-2; Daly, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 46. 201 See https://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2025). 202 Pen. Code § 290.46. 203 Pen. Code § 290.46(j)(1), (2)(E). 204 Pen. Code § 290.46(j)(4). 205 See, e.g., Donaleski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 WL 1296257, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2009) (Penal Code does not prohibit employer from discharging the plaintiff for a felony conviction even if employer first learned of possible conviction through a co-worker’s statement that the plaintiff’s name appeared on the Megan’s Law Website, where the co-worker had not looked at the website at the employer’s direction and where the employer did not consult the Website or discharge the plaintiff for being listed on the Website, but rather discharged the plaintiff after an independent investigation confirmed the felony conviction). 206 See Edu. Code § 45122.1(a) (school districts must not employ someone “convicted of a violent or serious felony”). 207 Lab. Code § 2922 (“An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month.”) 208 See generally Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 336-37 (2000). 209 See id. at 340 (“[D]isclaimer language in an employee manual or policy manual does not necessarily mean an employee is employed at will”); Stillwell v. Salvation Army, 167 Cal. App. 4th 360, 382-83 (2008) (employer not entitled to reversal of judgment for breach of impliedin-fact contract of continued employment even though several employee handbooks during plaintiff’s tenure recited that employment was at will). 210 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 340 n.10 (2000) (collecting cases holding that an express at-will agreement signed by the employee cannot be overcome by proof of a contrary implied understanding). 211 See id. at 340 & n. 11 (handbook disclaimer language is not controlling, but may be considered as evidence of at-will employment: “the more clear, prominent, complete, consistent, and all-encompassing the disclaimer language,” the greater the likelihood that the parties intended the employment to be at will). 212 Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 615 (1999) (affirming finding of implied contract notwithstanding at-will language in job application that by its terms was not “intended in any way to create an employment contract”). See generally Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Servs., 207 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1522 (2012) (declining to enforce arbitration clause contained within a handbook that stated, “This Handbook is not intended to create a contract of employment …”).
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