92 | Developments in Equal Pay Litigation 2026 ©2026 Seyfarth Shaw LLP year consent decree to settle those claims.739 In another recent matter, EEOC v. TKO Construction Services, No. 23-cv-3010 JRT TNL, the defendant agreed to pay $300,000 to settle race and sex discrimination claims under title VII, including claims that female and black employees received less pay than male and white employees.740 As noted above, the EPA overlaps with Title VII, which prohibits a broader range of discrimination on the basis of sex and also prohibits wage discrimination against other protected groups.741 The interplay between those two statutes has been the source of some interesting decisions over the past few years, including in the context of EEOC litigation. For one thing, Title VII claims are subject to an administrative exhaustion requirement that does not apply to EPA claims. Before a plaintiff can bring a Title VII claim, they must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The charge generally is a minimalistic form document that identifies the employer, the name of the individual bringing the charge, a general description of the type of discrimination, a brief statement of the harm(s) alleged, and a statement of whether similar proceedings have been instituted by any state or local agency.742 Nevertheless, the charge is an important document in EEOC litigation because that is what empowers the EEOC to investigate an employer. A question often arises as to whether and to what extent the EEOC can extend its investigation beyond the subject matter of the charge. For example, in Seif v. Board of Trustees of Alabama A&M,743 a tenured professor brought a wage discrimination claim under Title VII, alleging he was paid less than similarly situated employees due to his race, ethnicity, ancestry, and national origin. The plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination, but he had only discussed his salary as department Chair in the charge; he did not discuss his salary before he became a Chair. The employer argued that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to any claim based on his time as a member of the faculty before he made Chair.744 The court held that the purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate alleged discriminatory practices. “Given the purpose of the administrative exhaustion requirement, the Eleventh Circuit has held that ‘a ‘plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’”745 The court examined the charge and found that it discussed facts relevant to plaintiff’s salary before becoming Chair.746 Accordingly, the court found that the EEOC would have had an opportunity to investigate the employer’s alleged discriminatory practices as they related to plaintiff’s entire compensation, not just his compensation as Chair: “Excluding a claim related to [plaintiff’s] base salary because he used the phrase ‘salary as Chair’ in his EEOC charge would be to allow ‘procedural technicalities to bar claims,’ something the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned against.747 However, in Winns v. Exela Enterprise Solutions, Inc.,748 the court limited the scope of the EEOC’s case based on what was alleged in a charge. In that case, a Customer Service Associate for a technology company alleged a host of discrimination claims against his employer, including various wage discrimination claims. The employer argued that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies for some of those claims. The court acknowledged that “[t]he scope of the plaintiff's court action depends on the 739 See https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/seward-and-son-pay-150000-eeoc-race-and-national-origin-discrimination-lawsuit. 740 See https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/tko-construction-services-pay-300000-settle-eeoc-sex-race-and-age-discrimination-lawsuit. 741 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,” because of such individual's sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2). 742 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12. 743 Seif v. Bd. of Trs. of Ala. A&M, No. 5:15-cv-02374-MHH, 2022 WL 4376730 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 2022). 744 Id. at *6. 745 Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004)). 746 Id. at *7 (“Language throughout [plaintiff’s] EEOC charge makes clear that his discrimination claim concerns his overall salary— base salary plus $14,400 chair compensation, not simply his $14,400 chair compensation.”). 747 Id. (quoting Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280). 748 Winns v. Exela Enter. Solutions, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-06762-YGR, 2022 WL 4094137 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2022).
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