©2026 Seyfarth Shaw LLP Developments in Equal Pay Litigation 2026 | 19 and female employees regularly received cars, and that “none of the eight listed male employees who received company cars had the same combination of short tenure, deficient performance, and location as plaintiff.”86 The court concluded that “individual comparisons between employees both male and female who received cars do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant's gender neutral justifications for providing company cars, particularly given the variety of gender-neutral factors and the overall pattern of male and female recipients.”87 Another type of benefit that can support an EPA claim is differential parental leave policies. In Sparrow v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,88 a bus operator alleged his employer violated the EPA by allowing female employees to use accrued sick leave for up to six months when caring for newborns, while limiting male employees to just two days of sick leave for the same purpose. The court first rejected the defendant’s argument that the EPA does not cover benefits.89 Although the plaintiff could not identify a specific female comparator who received this benefit, the court held that evidence of the collective bargaining agreement's potentially discriminatory provisions could be sufficient to establish a prima facie EPA claim. The court thus denied summary judgment, finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether WMATA permitted women to use sick leave beyond recovery from childbirth for childcare purposes—a benefit allegedly denied to men in similar circumstances.90 When a disparity in benefits forms the basis of a gender discrimination claim, it is critical that a plaintiff establish their right to those benefits as a threshold matter.91 That is not always a simple feat, especially in the wake of the Supreme Court’s seminal decision, Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia,92 which held that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. That decision has rendered many workplace issues newly relevant, including the question of who qualifies for spousal benefits. For example, in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services,93 a data analyst for a religiously aligned organization alleged he was underpaid because certain health benefits were denied to his spouse even though they were provided to others in the same position. The plaintiff was a man married to a man. He claimed it was a violation of the EPA, among other laws, to provide health benefits to male spouses of female employees while denying those benefits to male spouses of male employees.94 The religious organization employer argued that it retained its religious character by, among other things, maintaining a code of conduct and administering its employee benefits program consistent with its religious values. Those values prevented it from providing spousal benefits to employees’ samesex spouses.95 Citing the Bostock decision, the court held: “When an employer discriminates against an employee based on sexual orientation, ‘it necessarily and intentionally discriminates against that individual in part because of sex. And that is all Title VII has ever demanded to establish liability.’”96 86 Id. at *17. 87 Id. See also Perdue v. Rockydale Quarries Corp., No. 7:18-cv-00416, 2019 WL 2216527, at *6 (W.D. Va. May 22, 2019) (holding that a female supervisor had adequately alleged a pay disparity based on her claim that she was allowed to use a company vehicle only for business travel while her male predecessor in the same position had been allowed to use a company vehicle for business travel and his commute to work: “While [employer] may ultimately disprove these allegations or establish that the alleged disparity was justified by a reason other than gender, the court concludes that the allegations are sufficient to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss”). 88 Sparrow v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, No. 22-2216 (JDB), 2024 WL 3551962 (D.D.C July 26, 2024). 89 Id. (“[T]he EPA has long been interpreted to cover benefits).” 90 Id. at *8. 91 See, e.g., Barney v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-616 JD, 2021 WL 3212383, at *10 (N.D. Ind. July 29, 2021) (holding that the denial of severance benefits to a female Senior Vice President was enough to establish a prima facie case, but that ultimately plaintiff had failed to establish that the denial was due to her gender because, under the company’s policies, she was not entitled to severance: “[employer] has put forth evidence that the difference in severance benefits was based on a factor other than sex; specifically, the difference was based on how the employees left their employment with [employer]. [Plaintiff] has not put forth evidence to place the facts surrounding that rationale in dispute”). 92 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 590 U.S. 644 (2020). 93 Doe v. Catholic Relief Servs., 618 F. Supp. 3d 244 (D. Md. 2022). 94 Id. at 250. 95 Id. at 249. 96 Id. at 252 (quoting Bostock, 590 U.S. at 665).
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